The EU's Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights: An International Law Perspective by Odermatt, J.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Odermatt, J. ORCID: 0000-0002-6073-3033 (2015). The EU's Accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights: An International Law Perspective. New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, 47, 59.. 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/20966/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online












 Working Paper No. 136 – April 2014 
 
THE EU’S ACCESSION TO THE  
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:  










 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488974 
2 
 
THE EU’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:  
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
Jed Odermatt  
 
ABSTRACT 
Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union establishes that the Union “shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” In early 
2013, negotiators of the 47 Council of Europe member states and the European Union finalised 
a draft Accession Agreement that would allow the EU to accede to the Convention. In this article 
I examine the issues and challenges that EU accession poses from an international law 
perspective. Much of the literature on the EU accession has focused on the effect that this 
process will have on the EU legal order, including questions regarding its autonomy. Yet EU 
accession also raises important issues for international law. It is another example of an 
international organization taking part in a legal system designed exclusively for participation by 
state parties. To what extent should the EU participate on an equal footing with the other 
contracting parties, and when are special rules required to take into account the nature of the 
EU legal order? The article explores the broader issues that arise when the EU seeks to 
participate in its own right in the international legal order. It is submitted that the EU’s accession 
to the ECHR is not only an important step for the EU legal order, but also a highly significant 
development for public international law. 
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THE EU’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:  





The EU’s relationship with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR or Convention)1 has for decades been a topic of academic discussion.  This 
debate examined the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or 
Luxembourg Court) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court), 
and how each legal system should deal with the law emanating from the other. It also discussed 
how the European Union, which itself is not a state, nor an ECHR contracting party, can be held 
to account for its actions via the ECHR framework. As the EU Member States transferred 
greater competences to the Union level, this gave rise to questions regarding the extent to 
which the EU itself might  be bound by the rights enshrined in the Convention. This led to a 
“gap” in human rights protection in Europe and the associated question of how this gap should 
be closed. The CJEU partly addressed this gap through its own case law, developing its own 
fundamental rights jurisprudence. The EU also addressed the gap by establishing its own 
human rights instruments, most importantly the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,2 
which, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, became part of EU primary law. 
However, in order to further close this gap in human rights protection, it was decided that the EU 
would become a full Contracting Party to the Convention alongside its Member States. 
 
The decision for the EU to accede to the Convention is enshrined as an obligation under Article 
6(2) of the Treaty on European Union3 (TEU) which states that “[t]he Union shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” Upon 
the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, Article 6(2) became a legally 
binding commitment upon the EU. This is more than a symbolic or political act on the part of the 
Union. Accession will for the first time allow for an external mechanism to review whether acts of 
the EU fulfill human rights standards. Accession by the EU poses numerous questions for EU 
law scholars, particularly regarding whether accession threatens the ‘autonomy’ of the EU legal 
order. Much of the discussion has focused, for example, on whether a balance can be struck 
between treating the EU in an identical manner as other Contracting Parties, and the need to 
take into account the specific nature of the EU legal order. Yet the EU’s accession also poses 
numerous important questions for public international law. Kosta et al. recently noted that the 
accession process gives rise to issues within three key disciplines: an EU law perspective, a 
constitutional law perspective, and a public international law perspective.4 They note that, “from 
                                               
1
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 
(‘ECHR’). 
2
 European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, OJ 2010, C 83/02. 
3
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) (2012) OJ C 326/1. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm). 
4
 V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris and V. Tzevelekos, Introduction: the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights 4 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) 561-564.  
5 
 
the perspective of public international law, the accession will place the EU under the jurisdiction 
of a regional international court that specialises in the protection of human rights.”5 This public 
international law perspective has mostly focused on the issue of responsibility. Although the 
topic of international responsibility has been relevant for a long time, the issue of responsibility 
of international organizations has received considerable attention from international law 
scholars in recent years.6 In 2011 the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted its Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO).7 One of the questions 
faced by Special Rapporteur Gaja and the ILC during this process was whether, and to what 
extent, the DARIO should include specialized rules of responsibility pertaining to the EU. 8 
Although the ILC rejected explicit provisions referring to the EU or to ‘regional economic 
integration organisations’ (REIOs), a proposal advocated by the European Commission, the 
need to develop specific rules to accommodate IOs such as the EU was discussed. Moreover, 
the Commentary on the DARIO also discusses the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights dealing with the responsibility of international organizations, including numerous cases 
relating to the EU.9 It is understandable then that international lawyers focus on the implications 
that EU accession will have on the law of responsibility of international organizations. EU 
accession has great legal significance in this regard since it is the first time that an international 
organization will formally submit itself to a system of external judicial human rights review.10 
 
Beyond responsibility, EU accession gives rise to numerous other questions under public 
international law. First, how will the EU take part in the ECHR system? This not only includes 
the Strasbourg Court, but also the mechanisms for supervision within the Committee of 
Ministers. How will the substantive law of the Strasbourg Court have to be adapted when 
applied to the EU, especially when much of its case law has been developed on the basis of all 
Contracting Parties being states? Accession also poses wider questions regarding the 
relationship between the EU and international law generally. EU accession to the ECHR will be 
the latest step in a broader trend where the EU takes part in its own right within international 
organizations and fora. The draft Accession Agreement, and the choices the negotiators made 
on a number of legal issues, further develops state practice in this field.  
 
                                               
5
 Kosta et al, supra note 4, 563. 
6
 See M. Ragazzi, Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, (Martinus Nijhoff 2013). 
7
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its sixty-third session (2011). 
8
 S. Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the European Community Require Special 
Treatment?’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today (2005), 405-421. See J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Are All 
International Organizations Created Equal?’ 9 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW REVIEW (2012) 7-14. 
9
 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, adopted by 
the International Law Commission at its sixty-third session (2011). 
10
 Although the EU became a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2010, this does not involve the 
same level of review and supervision as the ECHR system. The EU has not signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which allows the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to hear complaints from 
individuals and groups who claim to be victims of violations of the Convention (Art.1).  
6 
 
This article does not focus on the issue of international responsibility as many of these issues 
have been discussed extensively elsewhere by both international law11 and EU specialists.12 
Rather, this contribution focuses on other public international law issues, many of which have 
been overlooked in the academic debate. It also aims to contribute to the debate on how the EU 
takes part in the wider international legal order. Does EU accession represent a departure from 
established practice when the EU takes part in international legal instruments or is it in line with 
other instances where the EU has joined multilateral conventions? It seeks to understand what 
implications the EU’s accession may have for the evolving relationship between EU law and 
international law, and the effect the EU is having on the latter. It is submitted that EU’s 
accession to the ECHR is not only an important step for the EU legal order, but also a highly 




The first part of this article provides a brief sketch of the EU’s place within the international legal 
order. It demonstrates that many of the issues faced by the drafters of the agreement on 
accession were in fact not entirely novel, but have been faced for decades whenever the EU 
seeks to take part in the international legal order in its own right. The next part then visits the 
main reasons for EU accession to the ECHR. EU accession, it is argued, is more than a political 
or symbolic act, but one that seeks to remedy some of the deficiencies in the system of human 
rights protection in Europe. These reasons must be borne in mind when evaluating any draft 
agreement, and to understand whether it actually lives up to its purpose of safeguarding human 
rights. The article then turns to the provisions of the draft Accession Agreement itself with an 
eye to the international law issues that the Agreement raises. To what extent does the 
Agreement resemble other international agreements where the EU is a party? In areas where 
the Agreement indicates a novel approach, is this justified by the specific nature of the EU and 
ECHR legal orders? 
 
Two main issues are discussed. The first are “procedural,” relating to how the EU will participate 
in the Convention system, such as appearing as a respondent in cases before the ECtHR, 
electing judges, and taking part in other processes. The article then turns to the question of how 
the substantive human rights law of the ECHR may be applied to an international organization 
such as the EU. The EU’s accession to a Human Rights treaty poses international law issues 
that are not necessarily faced when the EU is a party to, for example, an agreement on trade or 
                                               
11
 See M. Evans and P, Koutrakos (eds) The International Responsibility of the European Union: European and International 
Perspectives (Hart, 2013); J. d’Aspremont, A European Law of International Responsibility? The Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations and the European Union, V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris and V. Tzevelekos (eds.), The EU Accession to the 
ECHR (Hart, 2014),; G. Conway, Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States, 13 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2002) 679; Maarten den Heijer, Shared Responsibility Before the European Court of Human 
Rights, NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, LX (2013) 411.  
12
 F. Hoffmeister, Litigating against the European Union and Its Member States – Who Responds under the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
International Responsibility of International Organizations?, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2010) 723; P.J. Kuijper 
and E. Paasivirta, Further Exploring International Responsibility: The European Union and the ILC’s Project on Responsibility of 
International Organizations 1INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW REVIEW (2004) 111; E. Paasivirta and P.J. Kuijper, Does One Size 
Fit All?: The European Community and the Responsibility of International Organizations,  36 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
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environmental protection. One reason for this is that the Convention and the case law of the 
Strasbourg Court have always envisaged the state as bearing the primary responsibility to 
ensure human rights within its jurisdiction. Applying this body of law to an international 
organization, especially to the EU, poses unique legal challenges. The article concludes by 
discussing the broader issue of the EU’s place within the international legal order, and whether 
and to what extent specialized rules are justified when the EU acts on the international legal 
plane.13 
 
2 THE EU IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
 
Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol 814 set out some of the basic conditions under which the EU shall 
accede to the ECHR. Accession by the EU is also provided for by Article 59(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which simply states that “the European Union may accede to this 
Convention.”15 This amendment came about by Protocol 14 to the ECHR, which entered into 
force on 1 June 2010 after ratification by the final Council of Europe member.16 However, these 
provisions leave many important questions unanswered, particularly regarding the modalities of 
EU’s participation within the Convention system. The answers to these questions had to be 
fleshed out through a process of negotiations that were finalized in a draft Accession 
Agreement. Official talks between representatives of the EU and the Council of Europe began in 
July 2010 17  and on 5 April 2013 the negotiators finalized a draft Accession Agreement 
(hereinafter ‘Accession Agreement’) 18  and a draft explanatory report to the Agreement 
(hereinafter ‘Explanatory Report’).19 
 
The drafters of the Accession Agreement were faced with numerous questions as to how the 
EU would accede to the ECHR, touching on the EU’s membership, participation and 
representation, responsibility and liability, and further amendments to the Convention. All of 
these questions arose due to the fact that accession is being undertaken by an international 
organization in a body that had been originally conceived and designed for participation by 
                                               
13
 Talmon, supra note 8. 
14
 Protocol (No. 8) Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
15
 Art 59(2) ECHR. 
16
 ‘Reform of European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No.14 enters into force’, Press Release 437(2010), Council of Europe, 
2010.  
17
 ‘European Commission and Council of Europe kick off joint talks on EU's accession to the Convention on Human Rights’, Press 
Release 545(2010), Council of Europe, 2010. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe nominated the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) to enter into discussions with the European Commission on working towards a draft 
accession agreement. An initial agreement was reached in July 2011, and the CDDH delivered its draft agreement and explanatory 
report. On 13 June 2012 the Committee of Ministers instructed the CDDH to resume negotiations as part of an ad hoc group “47+1” 
with a view to finalizing the accession agreement. 
18
 Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘Final report to the CDDH’, 47+1(2013)008rev2, Strasbourg, 10 
June 2013, Appendix I ‘Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 
19
 Fifth Negotiation Meeting Between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘Final report to the CDDH’, 47+1(2013)008rev2, Strasbourg, 10 
June 2013, Appendix V ‘Draft explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. 
8 
 
states. Many of these questions are posed whenever the EU seeks to take part in its own right 
within the international legal order.20 EU accession is in many ways an exceptional act that 
poses its own unique legal issues. However, EU participation in international fora, even in those 
that involve a system of external review, is not new. Many of the legal issues facing the drafters 
of the Accession Agreement have been dealt with in similar circumstances. The way in which 
the EU participates in the international legal order has undergone change over time and may 
affect both the EU and other international legal orders.21 
 
A recent example of the EU taking part in the international legal order is its efforts to obtain 
enhanced participation status within the United Nations General Assembly. 22  The EU had 
decided that in order to bring its status at the UN General Assembly in line with the letter and 
spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, it should push for the status of “enhanced observer.”23 Such a step 
would allow the EU to participate in the General Assembly and its associated bodies in its own 
right, without having to rely on the EU Member State holding the rotating Presidency. In order to 
achieve such status, however, the EU needed to persuade other UN members to vote for a 
specific UNGA resolution granting the EU greater participation rights. During negotiations for 
this resolution,24 the EU encountered a somewhat surprising level or resistance from some UN 
members, some of whom were highly skeptical about allowing the world organization, founded 
on the sovereign equality of its member states, giving enhanced status to a regional 
organization. While the Resolution eventually was adopted, albeit with less extensive rights than 
originally sought by the EU, the language of the resolution reminds us that the EU should not be 
regarded as an equal participant on par with UN member states, and that the EU’s participation 
in such a body remains an exceptional situation.  
 
This episode also demonstrates that the EU’s participation in the international system is not 
predicated solely on its own legal system; it is also subject to constraints imposed by the 
international legal order. For example, when the EU seeks participation within a treaty regime or 
international body, this often requires modifications to that system, sometimes even requiring 
amendment to the constitutive treaty of an IO. This was the case, for example, when the EU 
became a full member of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).25 In that case, an 
explicit treaty change was required to allow full membership of the EU as a regional economic 
integration organization. However much the EU may wish to join or upgrade its status within an 
                                               
20
 See J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Norms Emanating from International Bodies and Their Role in the Legal Order of the European 
Union’  in R.W. Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds) Between Autonomy and Independence: The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of 
International Organisations (2013) TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 47. 
21
 See J. Wouters, J. Odermatt and T. Ramopoulos, ‘The EU in the World of International Organizations: Diplomatic Aspirations, 
Legal Hurdles and Political Realities’, in M. Smith, S. Keukeleire, S. Vanhoonacker (eds), The Diplomatic System of the European 
Union: Evolution, Change and Challenges (Routledge 2014). 
22
 See J. Wouters, J. Odermatt, J. Ramopoulos, ‘The Status of the European Union at the United Nations General Assembly’ in I. 
Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege and S. Adam (eds), The European Union in the World Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2013). 
23
 P.A. Serrano de Haro, ‘Participation of the EU in the work of the UN: General Assembly Resolution 65/276’, CLEER Working 
Paper 2012/4, 9. 
24
 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/65/276 ‘Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations’. 
25
 See J.M Pedersen, ‘FAO-EU Cooperation: An Ever Stronger Partnership’, in J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister and T. Ruys (eds) The 
United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership,(Springer, 2007). 
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international organization, it is up to the other IO member states to agree to this. Moreover, 
resistance may also come from EU Member States themselves, who may view the EU’s 
international role as a threat to their own competences and role in international affairs.26 
 
When the EU takes steps to join or upgrade its status in an international organization or body, 
this entails both internal legal issues for the EU as well as issues for the IO itself. For the EU, 
issues arise regarding external representation and competences, especially in cases where the 
EU enjoys membership alongside some or all of its Member States. Furthermore, EU 
participation in an IO gives rise to questions regarding the extent to which decisions emanating 
from those IOs are binding upon the EU and the Member States.27 For the IO, issues arise 
regarding how the EU will participate in the organs of the IO alongside its Member States. In 
most cases, the EU does not legally “replace” the EU Member States; rather it often enjoys 
membership alongside them. This is the case even in bodies such as the WTO where the EU 
enjoys exclusive competence. Issues that arise for the IO involve voting rights, speaking rights, 
the right to put forward candidates for committees, and funding. While in some IOs EU 
participation is generally accepted, it may encounter opposition in other bodies, especially those 
related to the UN. Some non-EU states fear that EU participation can have a negative effect on 
the IO, and that participation by regional organizations threatens the rule of the sovereign 
equability of states, an important principle in the international legal order.28 There may also be a 
fear that EU participation may erode the rights of other members. The EU may be seen as 
unfairly gaining greater voice within the organization, or it may encourage “bloc voting” that can 
make it more difficult for the body to function.29  
 
In cases where the IO has established a dispute resolution or similar mechanism, further 
questions are raised regarding the EU’s involvement in that organ. Which party, either the EU or 
its Member States, will be responsible for implementing the provisions of an international 
agreement? This is especially problematic in the case of a so-called “mixed agreement” where 
the EU takes part alongside its Member States, and is expected to only act regarding issues 
relating to EU competences. How are third parties to know who has responsibility for the 
implementation of a certain commitment?30 This can be especially problematic due to the fact 
that the issue of competences is politically sensitive and legally complex within the EU legal 
system, and evolves over time. It is not always clear to outside observers who may exercise 
competence in a given field and who will be responsible for implementing international legal 
obligations. The EU is therefore highly reluctant to make definitive declarations regarding who is 
competent in each field. Even where the EU is legally bound to submit and continually update a 
“declaration of competences” in order to help third parties identify the appropriate party in a 
                                               
26
 See Wouters et. al supra note 21. 
27
 See Wouters et. al supra note 20. 
28
 The Bahamas argued that the Resolution might create “a new category of non-state observer with a unique  
complement of rights and privileges.” Statement by The Bahamas on behalf of CARICOM, 3 May 2011. See BBC, ‘UN Votes to Give 
European Union Special Rights’, 4 May 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13276053>. 
29
 Groussot et. al, supra note 90, 3. 
30
 Hoffmeister, supra note 12. 
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given dispute, these declarations are often overly broad and vague, and are not updated over 
time.31  
 
Many of the issues involved in the EU’s accession to the ECHR are not entirely novel, and have 
been addressed in some way or another in the context of other organizations and treaty 
regimes. Yet EU accession to the ECHR gives rise to a number of unique challenges. The 
ECHR is not a typical convention. Similar to the EU legal order, the Convention it is the 
foundation of a well-developed legal system, and imposes a wide range of legal obligations on 
its members. How will the EU, itself a highly-developed and complex legal order, interact with 
the ECHR system? Another unique challenge is the fact that  the ECHR was  designed to 
protect the fundamental human rights of individuals. Whereas the EU has participated in treaty 
bodies in the fields of trade or the environment, unique challenges arise from the ECHR’s goals 
at protecting human rights. How should a convention originally designed to manage the 
relationship between the individual and the state be applied to the relationship between the 
individual and the EU legal order?  
 
EU accession is also unique as it involves the EU joining another “European” body. In other 
multilateral fora, such as the UN, the EU often has to negotiate its position among many non-EU 
states. The Accession Agreement in many ways reflects the somewhat peculiar situation of the 
EU negotiating with another ‘European’ organization. In the context of ECHR accession, 
however, EU Member States were sitting on both sides of the table. This meant that the EU was 
able to attain concessions that it would not have otherwise attained had it been negotiating with 
another international organization with a more global membership. Had the EU been negotiating 
among 197 states from around the world, rather than 47 from Europe, the Union would not have 
been able to acquire such participation and other rights.  
 
3 WHY ACCEDE TO THE ECHR? 
 
The EU’s accession is now a legal obligation enshrined in the TEU.32  Yet it is worth examining 
why it was felt necessary for the EU to pursue accession in the first place. Accession is 
undoubtedly an important symbolic and political act; it sends the message that the EU not only 
speaks about human rights, but is itself willing to assume binding obligations under Europe’s 
key human right instrument. It could be argued, however, that EU accession is not entirely 
necessary. The EU already has a high level of human rights protection within its own legal 
order, and in some instances, these rights guarantees go even further than those protected by 
the ECHR.33 The Strasbourg Court has, in its own case law, acknowledged the fact that the EU 
legal order provides equivalent protection to the ECHR.34 Furthermore, the European Charter of 
                                               
31
 J. Heliskoski, ‘EU Declarations of Competence and International Responsibility’, in M. Evans and P, Koutrakos (eds) The 
International Responsibility of the European Union: European and International Perspectives (Hart, 2013) 189. 
32
 Art. 6(2) TEU: “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.” 
33
 For instance, the  European Charter includes protection of personal data (Art. 8), the rights of the elderly (Art. 25) and persons 
with disabilities (Art. 26), and generally introduces more protection of so-called ‘third generation’ rights. 
34
 Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1, para. 165: “the Court finds that the protection of fundamental rights by 
Community law can be considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, “equivalent” … to that of the Convention system.” 
11 
 
Fundamental Rights of the Union35 (hereinafter ‘Charter’) became legally binding upon the EU in 
2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Accession, it could be argued, is a legally 
complex and arduous process, one that is not justified by the potential benefits it could bring. 
Accession is not necessitated by any real crisis that put into focus a serious deficiency in the EU 
human rights protection system. Still, accession helps rectify certain gaps in the system of 
human rights protection in Europe. In addition to being an important symbolic act, accession 
provides the best solution to the incongruity of the EU’s not being a party to Europe’s key 
human rights instrument, while all its Member States are. While accession does not necessarily 
address all of these issues, it goes a long way to strengthening the system of human rights 
protection.  
 
One of the first reasons for EU accession is symbolic rather than legal. The EU seeks to 
promote human rights within the EU, but also sees human rights as a core part of its own 
foreign policy aims. The TEU states that “[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Union shall 
uphold and promote its values… [and] shall contribute to … the protection of human rights.”36 It 
may seem at the very least hypocritical if the EU were to promote human rights abroad while at 
the same time not subjecting its own legal order to any form of external human rights evaluation. 
By joining the ECHR system, the EU signifies to its own Member States and the outside world 
that it too is subject to international human rights, founded in international law, and supervised 
by an independent Court. 
 
3.1 MIND THE GAPS 
 
There are also legal reasons for accession. EU accession seeks to rectify two main ‘gaps’ that 
arise from the EU not being a party to the Convention.37 The first gap relates to the application 
of human rights to EU primary law, and the situation that arose in Matthews, where a Member 
State was sued for violations that took place at the level of EU primary law.38 The Strasbourg 
Court held that nothing prevents a State from transferring powers to an international 
organization such as the EU; however, the obligation to protect those rights is still incumbent on 
the Contracting Party. The Court stated that “[t]he Convention does not exclude the transfer of 
competences to international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be 
‘secured’.”39 EU accession would potentially prevent this situation. Upon accession, in a similar 
case, the EU presumably would be the respondent or co-respondent alongside the Member 
State. The second gap relates to Member States implementing binding Union law, such as in 
the Bosphorus case.40 Applicants have sought to challenge acts of the EU by bringing an action 
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against an EU Member State that was implementing Union law. The desire to bridge these gaps 
led to a somewhat messy line of case law from the Strasbourg Court, including the so-called 
‘equivalent protection’ doctrine set out in Bosphorus. 41  Accession seeks to address the 
problems associated with these two gaps. 
 
These gaps are not exclusive to the EU-ECHR context. Indeed, there are many instances where 
all the EU Member States are party to an international treaty, but the EU is not, giving rise to 
inconsistent legal obligations of the EU and its Member States. This occurs even for 
international agreements that cover fields where the EU has come to exercise considerable 
competences internally.42 There is nothing unique, therefore, about the situation created by the 
EU Member States being party to the ECHR while the EU is not. In many cases, there is simply 
no pressing need for the EU to become a party to a treaty. For instance, the obligations under 
the treaty could be met exclusively or predominantly by the Member States themselves, without 
any need for the EU to take part as well. A problem arises, however, in cases where the 
Member States have transferred significant competences in an area covered by a treaty to the 
EU. In this case the international legal obligations continue to apply to the EU Member States as 
parties to the treaty, while the EU, the party that is actually capable of complying with the treaty 
obligations, is not. While the EU may seek to act in conformity with the treaty in order to ensure 
respect for the Member State’s obligations under the treaty, the EU is not formally bound by 
those commitments. This is because the EU is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity 
with its own legal personality under international law, and can only be bound by obligations it 
has voluntarily entered into.43  
 
This dynamic between the EU and its Member States gave rise to one of the legal problems in 
Air Transport Association of America,44 which considered inter alia the EU’s possible obligations 
under the Chicago Convention,45 a treaty to which the EU is not a party, but all its Member 
States are. ATA and others argued that, since the EU Member States had transferred 
significant, if not full, competences to the EU in the field of air transport, and since it was the EU 
that was actually in a position to fulfill the obligations under the convention, the EU should be 
legally bound by the Chicago Convention. This argument was based on the CJEU’s reasoning 
in International Fruit Company, 46  where the Luxembourg Court held that the EC was the 
successor to the Member States in respect of GATT since the Member States had transferred 
exclusive competence to it in the field of trade. The CJEU rejected the application of the 
succession theory in Air Transport Association of America, however, since the Member States 
had transferred many, but not all competences in the field of air transport to the Union. 
According to the case law of the CJEU, functional succession can only take place in 
circumstances where a “full transfer of powers” had taken place.47 This meant that the EU, a 
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major international actor in the field of air transport, was not bound by the Chicago Convention 
despite the fact that all its Member States were. 
 
The succession theory, as applied in International Fruit Company, was also put forward as a 
possible method by which the EU could be made subject to the obligations under human rights 
law, including the ECHR.48 This would have allowed the EU to be bound by the obligations 
under the Convention without having to go through the process of officially acceding to the 
Convention. Under this scenario, the EU would be considered to have “succeeded” to the 
obligations under the Convention by virtue of the fact that all Member States are parties to the 
Convention and have transferred significant competences to the Union. However, the theory of 
functional succession has only been applied by the CJEU in very limited circumstances. In the 
GATT context, for example, it was clear that the EU was already acting de facto as a party to 
the treaty. Furthermore, since the EC had exclusive competence in the area of Common 
Commercial Policy, the CJEU found that the EU Member States had intended that the 
obligations under the GATT apply to the EC. The CJEU has been far more reluctant to find 
succession in the context of other international treaties, and has not accepted the succession 
theory in relation to the ECHR.49  In the case of the ECHR, it was decided that the best way to 
deal with this issue was for the EU to accede as a full contracting party to the Convention. 
 
One of the benefits of the succession theory is that it prevents gaps arising from the differing 
legal obligations of the Member States and the Union. It prevents the situation whereby States 
could escape their legal obligations under a treaty by establishing a separate international 
organization and transferring powers to it. Yet the functional succession approach is problematic 
from a public international law perspective. It seems to contradict the legal assumption that an 
international organization has a separate and distinct legal personality, and that legal persons 
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should only be bound by international obligations that they voluntarily enter into in their own 
right. The succession doctrine imagines the EU as a sum of the legal obligations of its Member 
States, rather than as a legally separate and autonomous legal order.  
 
Another problem with the succession approach is that it reduces legal certainty. One would not 
be sure when an international organization such as the EU was bound by the legal obligations 
of its Members in any given case. It may also have the effect of discouraging States from 
establishing international organizations if, upon its creation, that body was automatically 
encumbered by the obligations of its members. Instead, the approach under international law 
has been to treat international organizations as separate legal entities that are only bound by 
treaties to which they have voluntarily entered into, rather than as an amalgamation of the legal 
obligations of the various members.  
 
3.2 EXTERNAL REVIEW 
 
Upon accession, the EU will not only be subject to human rights obligations by virtue of its 
internal legal order, but also due to its obligations under international law. According to EU law, 
international treaties are binding upon the Union from the moment they enter into force.50 The 
human rights obligations owed by the Union will therefore stem from international law as well as 
from EU law. This is a subtle, but potentially important difference in the nature of the obligations. 
Upon accession the EU will be subject to a system of external human rights review. This is 
perhaps the most important change. The EU legal system as it currently stands does not have 
manifest deficiencies with regard to human rights. However, the EU’s overall positive human 
rights record is not in itself an argument against accession. There are many states within the 
ECHR system that have excellent human rights records and whose legal systems are designed 
to ensure human rights protection within their jurisdictions. The fact that these states are party 
to the Convention in no way implies that there is any deficiency or inadequacy in their legal 
systems. Similarly, the EU’s accession to the ECHR is not an admission that there are 
deficiencies in the EU system of human rights protection. It simply means that the EU is subject 
to the same level of scrutiny as its Member States. Put another way, it means that a citizen’s 
human rights are subject to the same level of protection irrespective of whether the breach 
stems from an act committed by the EU or an EU Member State. Moreover, while the EU may 
protect human rights today, it may be possible that its actions could give rise to human rights 
violations in the future. The EU, like its Member States, is constantly evolving and adapting, and 
one could imagine a situation whereby its actions could have far-reaching human rights 
consequences and where its internal mechanisms are unable or unwilling to address them. 
External review is a mechanism to help ensure that those internal legal safeguards are in place 
and working.  
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The preamble to the draft Accession Agreement states that “… the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention will enhance coherence in human rights protection in Europe.” This 
coherence is a key reason behind EU accession. By the EU submitting its legal order to a 
system of external review, there is less likelihood that a divergence will emerge between the EU 
and ECHR legal orders with regard to the interpretation and application of human rights law. At 
present, fundamental human rights are to be protected by virtue of EU law. Under Article 6(1) 
TEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has “the same legal value as 
the Treaties.”51 Furthermore, Article 6(3) TEU states that  
 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law.52 
 
Under this construction, it is the EU itself that is competent to interpret and apply these rights as 
they find their origins in EU law. The EU Treaties provide the CJEU with the exclusive role to 
interpret EU law.53 The issue of divergence is addressed by Article 52 of the Charter, which 
states that in cases where EU Charter and ECHR rights correspond, the meaning and scope of 
the rights shall be the same as set out by the EHCR.54 This clause aims to prevent differing or 
even conflicting interpretations of human rights law by the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg 
Court while still allowing EU law to provide greater protection. Despite this clause, there may be 
instances where the CJEU takes a different approach to that of the Strasbourg Court.55 Upon 
assessing the CJEU’s case law since the Charter was made formally binding in 2009, de Búrca 
concluded that there is still a potential for divergence between EU and ECHR human rights 
standards:   
 
There are still concerns, despite the ‘judicial diplomacy’ which has developed 
between the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights, that a disparity 
between the approaches of the two courts – to the detriment of human rights 
protection – may grow if the CJEU increasingly distances itself from the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and places emphasis on an autonomous 
EU approach to the interpretation of the Charter.56  
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Article 344 TFEU sets out that “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning 
the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those 
provided for therein.”57 This is because a decentralized system that allowed other bodies to 
interpret EU law could lead to differing or even conflicting legal interpretations. It is for this 
reason that the EU has sought to prevent other bodies being capable, even indirectly, of 
interpreting EU law. 58  In the same way that the CJEU is entrusted with guaranteeing the 
interpretation of the EU Treaties, the European Court of Human Rights is entrusted with 
interpreting the ECHR. Tulkens points out that “[w]ithout the accession of the EU, the 
Strasbourg Court will be unable to discharge this responsibility in situations where the Court of 
Justice interprets the Convention when applying the Charter in cases examined on the merits.”59 
With EU accession, the EU’s commitments will be binding under international law and should be 
therefore interpreted in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The rights in the 
Convention and Charter are not always clear-cut and are constantly being interpreted in 
response to new situations. Upon accession, there is less chance that the Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg courts will follow substantially different paths since the Convention will be directly 




Accession will also potentially address the gap in the human rights system regarding the 
inability of individuals to challenge EU acts directly. According to EU law, individuals are only 
capable of directly challenging EU acts under very limited circumstances.61 As the system now 
stands, there is no way to bring the EU before the Strasbourg Court, since the Union is not a 
party to the Convention. This has led applicants to challenge EU measures indirectly by bringing 
cases against EU Member States, such as in cases where the state is implementing binding EU 
law.62 Once the EU becomes a party to the Convention, however, individuals will be capable of 
bringing cases against the EU when they believe that their rights have been affected by EU 
acts. Accession may also encourage the EU to reform its own legal order to make it easier for 
individuals to challenge EU acts before the CJEU. This could happen, for instance, if ECHR 
cases were to expose deficiencies in the EU’s legal system with regard to the rights of 
individuals to challenge acts of the EU. While these deficiencies could be dealt with potentially 
through the case law of the CJEU or even EU legislation, certain amendments may be required 
to the EU Treaties in order to bring the EU order in line with the Convention. 
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EU accession may place the EU under positive obligations to protect and respect human rights. 
Europe’s human rights instruments generally focus on negative obligations, that is, the 
obligation to refrain from certain conduct. Ahmed and Butler argue, for instance, that “[t]he EU’s 
internal human rights regime is interpreted only to curtail positive acts by the EU institutions, not 
to mandate positive acts by them.”63 Under ECHR law, however, contracting parties not only 
have to refrain from certain behavior, but also have positive obligations to ensure the rights in 
the Convention.64 It was recognized early on in the life of the Convention that in order for human 
rights to be secured, certain positive obligations must be imposed upon the state. 65  One 
question that will arise, therefore, is the extent to which the EU will be subject to greater positive 
obligations to prevent, deter and investigate human rights violations within its jurisdiction. This is 
perhaps one area where different treatment between the EU and other state parties is 
warranted. The state is capable of directly investigating and punishing human rights abuses 
within its jurisdiction, while the EU mostly relies on the Member States’ authorities to implement 
EU law. 
 
EU participation in the Convention System 
 
A final argument in favour of accession to the ECHR is that, as a party to the Convention, the 
EU will be able to participate directly in the Convention system along with other Contracting 
Parties. If the EU were to be bound by the ECHR via the succession doctrine, the EU would 
have been bound by the ECHR obligations, but unable to participate in the wider Convention 
mechanisms. The way in which the EU will be able to participate in these bodies is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
More than Symbolism 
 
Some commentators emphasize the symbolic value of EU accession.66 Klabbers, for instance, 
argues that one of the reasons for EU accession is “to provide [the EU] with a new foundational 
myth to justify the existence of the EU and help raise its input legitimacy.”67 This symbolism is 
undoubtedly important, and enhances the EU’s credibility as a human rights actor. However, the 
EU’s accession to the ECHR will also have a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights in 
Europe. In fact, Accession can have a positive effect without the EU ever appearing before the 
Strasbourg Court.  
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[T]he fact that a State is a party to a human rights treaty means that there is a 
legal yardstick against which its practice can be measured, while politically the 
issue of rights will be more prominent than might otherwise be the case … with 
the State’s obligations to the individual as a constant background to official 
deliberations, the impact of a treaty such as the European Convention is likely to 
be out of all proportion to the number of cases in which conduct is actually 
challenged.68 
 
By acceding to the Convention, and subjecting the EU to an external system of evaluation, 
human rights will be a “constant background.” ECHR Accession provides a yardstick by which 
EU policies and human rights protection can be measured.  
 
The next section turns to the Draft Accession Agreement to evaluate the extent to which it is 
capable of fulfilling these basic aims. While much attention has focused on whether the 
Agreement respects the autonomy of the EU, ultimately the Agreement should be assessed 
according to whether it is capable of strengthening the human rights system in Europe.  
 
4 OVERVIEW OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT 
 
The TEU and Protocol 8 give little guidance on the conditions under which the EU should 
accede to the ECHR. In addition to Article 6(2) setting out the EU’s obligation to accede to the 
ECHR, Protocol 8 69  sets out some basic requirements for any agreement on accession. 
Protocol 8 states that the accession agreement “shall make provision for preserving the specific 
characteristics of the Union and Union law.” 70  It specifies two particular elements. First, 
arrangements should be made for the EU’s participation in the control bodies of the 
Convention.71 This means that the EU should not only be subject to the Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisdiction, but it should also be able to take part in the wider Convention machinery, such as 
the election of judges and enforcement of judgments. Second, it states that mechanisms should 
be put in place in order to ensure that applications are addressed to the correct party, either the 
EU or the Member States where appropriate.72 According to the Protocol, the agreement must 
also “ensure that accession of the Union shall not affect the competences of the Union or the 
powers of its institutions.”73 The Protocol also states that nothing in the accession agreement 
shall affect Article 344 TFEU. It could be argued that this requirement in Protocol 8 is already 
found in EU law, according to which international agreements entered into by the Union must 
not violate provisions of EU primary law.74 This includes the need for any Accession Agreement 
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to respect the “autonomy” of the EU legal order.75 This of course gives rise to the complex 
question of what exactly autonomy entails and requires.76 
 
While representatives of the Union and the CDDH discussed EU accession, parallel discussions 
took place between delegations from the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. On 17 January 2011, delegations from the two Courts discussed 
inter alia issues regarding the EU’s accession to the ECHR, and the effects this may have on 
the two European Courts. A Joint Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris was 
published, outlining their opinion on important issues regarding the modalities of a draft 
agreement. The Communication stressed above all that a procedure should be put in place to 
allow the CJEU to undertake its own internal review before a case is heard by the Strasbourg 
Court.77 The text of this Communication has been extremely influential since it outlines the 
issues of key importance to both Courts. Before the Accession Agreement enters into force it 
will be the subject of an Opinion by the CJEU.78 For the Agreement to survive this step in the 
process, it presumably must at least satisfy the requirements set out in this Joint 
Communication. 
 
The drafters of the Accession Agreement had to satisfy multiple demands. In addition to the 
documents referred to above, the Accession Agreement must satisfy the basic requirements of 
EU constitutional law. The agreement also must be approved by all EU Member States as well 
as the European Parliament (a condition enshrined in the TFEU).79 While much is made of 
whether the autonomy of the EU legal order may be threatened by accession, one may also 
discuss whether EU accession may have a negative effect on the ECHR legal order. The 
Agreement must satisfy the members of the Council of Europe, whose approval is also required 
for it to enter into force. To this end, the drafters were involved in a careful balancing act.80 They 
needed to ensure that the EU accedes, as far as possible, under the same conditions as the 
other Contracting Parties. At the same time, certain provisions needed to be designed to 
account for the “specific characteristics” of the Union and Union law. The preamble to the 
Accession Agreement states that, “having regard to the specific legal order of the European 
Union, which is not a State, its accession requires certain adjustments to the Convention system 
to be made by common agreement.”81 However, these “certain adjustments” should not amount 
to giving the EU “special treatment.” Moreover, they should not threaten the well-functioning of 
the ECHR system. But what exactly are the “specific characteristics” of the EU legal order, and 
when can these justify specialized rules for the EU? The following section provides an overview 
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of the draft Accession Agreement and examines how the drafters sought to strike a balance 
between specialized rules and special treatment. 
 
4.1 EU ACCESSION CLAUSE 
 
When the EU joins an international organization or becomes a party to a multilateral convention, 
a specific clause often has to be inserted to allow for EU participation. This usually takes one of 
two forms. First, the founding instrument may refer to the European Union specifically as a 
member. This is the case, for instance, in the WTO Agreement.82 Similarly, the Convention on 
the elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia simply states that “[t]he European Economic 
Community may accede to the present Convention.”83 The second and more common option is 
for the instrument to include a so-called ‘Regional Economic Integration Organization’ (REIO) or 
‘Regional Integration Organization’ (RIO) clause. These clauses allow accession by 
organizations other than the EU, often requiring that organization to have met specific criteria, 
such as having transferred competences under the relevant treaty to that regional 
organization.84 While REIO clauses allow for the possibility of membership by other international 
organizations, in reality the EU is often the only organization that joins as a full member. The 
REIO clause avoids the constitutive instrument of the organization referring to the EU 
specifically, and allows for the possibility of other regional organizations to join in the future. For 
instance, Article 44 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities allows for 
participation of “Regional integration organizations.” It employs a commonly-used definition: a 
REIO is an “organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member 
States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention.”85 The 
term “State Parties” throughout the convention applies to such organizations “within the limits of 
their competence.”86  
In the case of the EU’s accession to the ECHR, however,  there will be a specific clause 
mentioning the EU, rather than “regional organizations” generally. The European Convention on 
Human Rights was amended to include a specific clause stating that “[t]he European Union may 
accede to this Convention.”87 This means that if any other organization wishes to accede to the 
ECHR, this would require further amendment to the Convention and a similar accession 
agreement. The decision to refer to the EU specifically, rather than through a REIO clause, 
demonstrates the exceptional nature of the EU and its place within the ECHR system. It is not 
envisaged that any other international organization within Europe, such as Euratom or the 
European Free Trade Association, would similarly be able to accede in the future.  
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4.2 PARTICIPATION IN THE CONVENTION SYSTEM 
 
It was decided that the EU, by acceding to the ECHR, would not only be capable of appearing 
as a respondent before the Strasbourg Court, but that it may also take part in the wider ECHR 
machinery. The draft Agreement therefore had to answer questions regarding how the EU 
would participate in the ECHR bodies alongside the EU Member States. This issue is further 
complicated by the fact that, unlike the other ECHR parties, the EU will accede to the ECHR 
only, and will not become a member of the Council of Europe. 
 
Article 20 ECHR states that the number of Judges shall be equal to the number of contracting 
parties,88 which implies that there should also be a judge with respect to the European Union. 
Article 22 ECHR sets out that “judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with 
respect to each High Contracting Party.” 89  This means that there is no need for a formal 
amendment to the Convention to allow an extra judge in respect of the EU. There was 
discussion about whether the “EU judge” should exercise the same rights and duties as the 
other judges, or whether special rules should apply in respect of this judge. For instance, the 
“EU judge” might only take part in cases where the EU is a party to the proceedings, or where 
the case involves questions of EU law. This may have prevented the appearance of “double 
representation” whereby the EU is represented via an EU Member State and an EU judge.  
 
At the same time, it was argued by some that an “EU judge” is necessary in order to ensure EU 
representation and so that there is knowledge on how the “specific characteristics” of EU law 
should be taken into account.90 The problem with this argument, however, is that while the “EU 
judge” will be nominated by the EU, he or she will in no way “represent” the EU in the ECHR 
system. It is clear from the Convention that the judges are to be independent and sit in their 
individual, not national, capacity.91 It is also clear from the Explanatory Report that the judge in 
respect of the EU will participate on an equal footing with the other judges.92 The concept of 
having a judge in respect of the EU is somewhat novel, and does not appear in other 
Conventions where the EU is a party. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
is composed of 21 members, elected via secret ballot after having been nominated by a State 
Party.93 There is no “EU judge,” and the Statute forbids more than one member of the Tribunal 
from the same state.94 Within the WTO framework, there are no separate provisions to allow an 
EU member to take part in the Dispute Settlement Body.95 Article 8(1) of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding simply provides that “Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental 
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and/or non-governmental individuals.” The inclusion of a judge in respect of the EU is unique in 
the context of the EU joining international organizations. 
 
The inclusion of an “EU judge” gives rise to questions regarding their nomination and election. 
According to Article 22 ECHR, judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe from a list of three candidates nominated by the Contracting Party.96 The EU will also 
be able to take part in the election of judges in the same manner. According to the Accession 
Agreement, whenever the Parliamentary Assembly exercises its functions in relation to Article 
22 ECHR, the European Parliament shall be entitled to participate with the right to vote. The 
number of representatives accorded to the European Parliament is to be equal to that of the 
highest number of representatives to which any State is entitled under Article 26 of the Statute 
of the Council of Europe, which is 18.  
 
According to the Accession Agreement, the European Parliament’s modalities for participation in 
this regard are to be defined by the Parliamentary Assembly, in cooperation with the European 
Parliament. Judges nominated by the EU will therefore go through the same process as other 
judges nominated by Contracting Parties. It is not yet clear by which process the EU judge will 
be nominated, and who will be involved in selecting nominees. It will be up to the EU to decide 
on its own process of nominating a judge, in accordance with its internal legal order. The 
Agreement also gives the European Parliament a greater role in representing the EU 
internationally, a role that has generally been played by the European Commission97 and other 
institutional actors. 
 
A related issue is the extent to which the EU may participate in the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers has several responsibilities regarding the 
work of the ECtHR, including the monitoring of commitments by Contracting Parties and the 
supervision of the execution of judgments.98 According to the Accession Agreement, the EU 
shall be entitled to participate in the Committee of Ministers, with the right to vote, in regard to 
decisions under the following articles: Article 26(2) (to reduce, at the request of the plenary 
Court, the number of judges of the Chambers); Article 39(4) (the execution of the terms of a 
friendly settlement); Article 46 (2) to (5) (execution of judgments); Article 47 (advisory opinions) 
and Article 54(1) (Powers of the Committee of Ministers).99 The issue of EU voting rights in IOs 
is often a sensitive subject, and voting within the Committee of Ministers is no exception. During 
the negotiations the EU was in favour of a right to participate and vote on all issues regarding 
the Strasbourg Court. Once again, however, the “double representation” of EU Member States 
is an issue. Furthermore, non-EU states can argue that the EU Member States could vote en 
bloc to prevent decisions that would be unfavorable to the EU or its Member States.  
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Under EU law, EU Member States are under an obligation to act in a coordinated manner when 
expressing statements and voting within international fora.100 While the precise nature of this 
obligation is still being developed in the case law of the CJEU,101 it is likely that the EU Member 
States would be under an obligation to vote in a coordinated manner. There was a concern, 
therefore, that the combined votes of the EU Member States and the European Union could 
impede the effective functioning of the Committee of Ministers, especially in cases where it 
exercises supervision of judgments under Articles 39 and 46 ECHR.102  
 
Special voting rules have been established regarding the situation where the Committee of 
Ministers exercises its supervisory function with regard to obligations upon the EU alone or 
upon the EU and one or more of its Member States jointly. The Accession Agreement includes a 
Draft Rule to be added to the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the 
execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in cases to which the European 
Union is a party. This rule effectively sets out different voting requirements for certain decisions 
to be taken. For instance, decisions by the Committee of Ministers under Rule 17 (Final 
Resolution) shall be adopted “if a majority of four fifths of the representatives casting a vote and 
a majority of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee of Ministers are in 
favour”103 instead of the majority set out in Article 20.d of the Statute of the Council of Europe.104 
These rules do not themselves make up part of the Accession Agreement, but are intended to 
be adopted by the Committee of Ministers. The EU’s accession to the ECHR will introduce a 
more complex system of voting and participation. 
 
This voting arrangement deviates from the established voting practice in most other 
international bodies where the EU is a member alongside its Member States. In international 
organizations where voting takes place, the IO is faced with the issue of how to reconcile the 
fact that the EU is a separate legal entity that should prima facie have the right to vote, and the 
fact that the EU is constituted by other Member States who will retain their right to vote. Most 
organizations seek to avoid the issue of ‘double representation’ that this entails. In the vast 
majority of cases, the EU and the EU Member States exercise voting rights alternatively, that is, 
when the EU exercises its right to vote the EU Member States will not be entitled to vote, and 
vice-versa. The decision to exercise these voting rights as the EU or as the EU Member States 
separately often follows the issue of competences. For instance, the Member States may 
exercise their right to vote on issues relating to funding of the IO.  
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This setup prevents the EU from “gaining” an extra vote through becoming a member of the IO. 
For example, Article 4(4) of Annex IX of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) states that “Participation of … an international organization shall in no case entail an 
increase of the representation to which its member States which are States Parties would 
otherwise be entitled, including rights in decision-making.”105 The Constitution of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a typical example of a clause that provides the voting 
arrangements in organizations where the EU is a member alongside its Member States: 
 
A Member Organization shall exercise membership rights on an alternative basis 
with its Member States that are Member Nations of the Organization in the areas 
of their respective competences and in accordance with rules set down by the 
Conference.106 
 
Article 9 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization states that “[w]here the 
European Communities exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of votes equal to 
the number of their Member States which are members of the WTO.”107 The Statute of the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) states that, regarding a regional economic 
integration organization, “[t]he organisation and its Member States shall not be entitled to 
exercise rights, including voting rights, under the Statute concurrently.”108   
 
The Accession Agreement is novel in that it allows the EU Member States and the European 
Union to exercise their voting rights concurrently. One reason for this may be the fact that it 
would be difficult to tell when the EU or the Member States should exercise voting rights in the 
ECHR system. Unlike in other multilateral fora, where either the EU or the Member States 
exercise voting rights depending on the field of competence at issue, both the EU and the 
Member States may be involved simultaneously in the Committee of Ministers. However, 
special arrangements are to be introduced in order to prevent the combined votes of the EU and 
the Member States do not prejudice the Committee of Minister’s supervisory functions. 109  
France and the UK considered that the special voting arrangements could set a dangerous 
precedent, since third states may seek to curtail the voting rights of the EU and the Member 
States where they participate jointly in other fora. 110  The EU’s negotiating partners were 
adamant to include these arrangements due to the specific nature of the Committee of 




                                               
105
 Article 4(4) of Annex IX, UNCLOS. 
106
 Art. II, Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
107
 Art.9, Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.  
108
 Article XI, Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).  
109
 See Explanatory Report, supra note 19, para. 82. 
110
 Council of the European Union, ‘Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR): - State of play’ 16385/11, Brussels, 8 November 2011. See T. Lock, End of an Epic? 





The issue of funding is also raised whenever the EU seeks to participate in an international 
organization or body. In the context of the EU’s ECHR accession, the situation is made 
somewhat more complex by the fact that the EU is not a member of the Council of Europe. 
Under Article 50 ECHR, the expenditure of the European Court of Human rights is to be borne 
by the Council of Europe.111 Participation by the EU in the ECHR system will no doubt add to 
the expenses of the Council of Europe and the Strasbourg Court. This not only includes costs of 
running the ECtHR, but also expenditure related to the process of supervision of the execution 
of judgments, as well as expenditures related to the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of 
Ministers, and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when they undertake work 
related to the Convention.  
 
It was never disputed that the EU should contribute to this added expenditure. However, unlike 
the other Contracting Parties, since the EU will not become a member of the Council of Europe, 
it should in principle not pay assessed contributions to the overall budget of the organization. 
Article 8 of the Accession Agreement sets out how the EU’s annual contribution shall be 
calculated. The EU’s contribution is fixed at 34% of the highest contribution made in the 
previous year by any State to the budget of the Council of Europe, in addition to the 
contributions of the individual EU Member States. It was estimated that the increased costs 
imposed by the EU’s participation, including IT, logistics, and administration would amount to 
15%. This change will not require any amendment to the Convention itself, but is nevertheless 
an issue defined in the Accession Agreement. The drafters sought to ensure that the EU’s 
contribution would be calculated in a relatively straightforward and simple manner.112 
 
The issue of funding is also somewhat complicated whenever the EU takes part in an 
international organization alongside its Member States. On the one hand, since the EU shall 
accede on an equal footing with other Contracting Parties, the EU should contribute to the 
organization in the same manner. Yet on the other hand, the situation should be avoided 
whereby the EU Member States effectively pay twice, first via their membership in the IO, and 
secondly via their membership in the EU. International organizations use different rules to 
manage this situation. For example, in the World Trade Organization, contributions are based 
on each Member’s share of international trade.113 It would arguably be unfair if the EU would 
make a contribution in addition to that of the individual Member States, so the EU itself does not 
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directly contribute to the WTO budget. In the Food and Agriculture Organization, where the EU 
is a full member, the EU does not contribute to the budget in the same manner as the members 
that are states.114 Rather, Article XVIII, paragraph 6 states that “[a] Member Organization shall 
not be required to contribute to the budget as specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, but shall 
pay to the Organization a sum to be determined by the Conference to cover administrative and 
other expenses arising out of its membership in the Organization.” 115  In 2011 this annual 
payment made to the FAO was € 270,000.116 A similar clause can be found in Article 9(2) of the 
Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, to which the EU is a contracting 
party. The clause provides that the member organization shall not contribute to the budget of 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, but shall pay a sum to be determined by 
the Conference, “to cover additional administrative expenses arising out of its membership.”117 
In this vein, the Accession Agreement also requires the Union to contribute to the funding of the 
ECHR machinery, stating that the EU shall “pay an annual contribution dedicated to the 
expenditure related to the functioning of the Convention.”118 Generally, the way in which the 
Accession Agreement deals with the issue of financial contribution by the EU corresponds with 
the established practice associated with the EU’s involvement in other international 
organizations. It seeks to strike a balance between the need to fund the extra costs associated 
with participation by an international organization, but does not require it to pay assessed 
contributions in an identical manner to state Contracting Parties. 
 
4.4 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER AGREEMENTS 
 
A further complication that arises from EU accession involves the EU’s relationship with other 
international agreements linked to the Convention system. For example, the European 
Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of Human 
Rights is a separate international agreement that requires Parties to ensure that persons 
participating in proceedings instituted under the ECHR enjoy immunity from legal process in 
respect of their acts before the Strasbourg Court.119 Similarly, the Sixth Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe relates to privileges and 
immunities granted to the judges of the ECtHR. The EU will not accede to these conventions as 
such. The General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities is only open to member States of 
the Council of Europe, and would have to be amended to allow the EU to accede to it. Article 9 
of the Accession Agreement states that the EU will, within the limits of its competence, “respect 
the provisions of” the relevant articles of these treaties.120 It also states that the Contracting 
Parties “shall treat the European Union as if it were a Contracting Party to that Agreement or 
Protocol.” While the EU will not accede to these treaties, the EU could be seen to have 
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“unilaterally assumed the obligations” under international law.121 In any event, given the nature 
of privileges and immunities, it will most likely be the Member States, not the EU, that will be 
responsible for implementing these obligations.  
 
4.5  CO-RESPONDENT MECHANISM 
 
Protocol 8 states that the Accession Agreement should contain provisions for “the mechanisms 
necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States and individual applications are 
correctly addressed to Member States and/or the Union as appropriate.”122 There was always a 
question regarding how the Strasbourg Court would ensure that proceedings are brought 
against the appropriate party, either against the EU, a Member State, or both. This is perhaps 
one of the most highly debated issues in the discussions on EU accession. As a general rule, it 
is for the party or parties bringing proceedings before the ECtHR to decide against whom they 
shall bring an application. When the EU becomes a party to the Convention, applications may 
potentially be brought against the EU regarding a violation of the Convention. This may include 
situations where a Member State is applying binding EU law (Bosphorus situations) or where 
the applicant alleges a violation of the Convention stemming from primary EU law (Matthews 
situations). The Accession Agreement seeks to avoid situations where proceedings are brought 
against the wrong party. 
 
There were potentially a number of ways to address this issue. One option might have been to 
follow the EU’s practice where it takes part in other multilateral treaties. In many cases where 
the EU and its Member States take part in a multilateral treaty alongside one another, in a so-
called “mixed agreement,” the Union is required to submit a “declaration of competence” that 
addresses the question of who has competence with respect to particular obligations under the 
treaty.123 For example, Article 6(1) of Annex IX of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) states that “[p]arties which have competence under article 5 of this Annex [referring 
to declarations of competence] shall have responsibility for failure to comply with obligations or 
for any other violation of this Convention.”124 One of the assumptions behind a declaration of 
competence is that responsibility for breach of the convention should follow the distribution of 
competence.125 In disputes arising from the Convention, it allows third parties to know whether 
to bring claims against the EU or an EU Member State.126  
 
However, in the case of the ECHR, it would not have been appropriate to require the EU to 
submit a declaration of competence. One reason relates to the type of rights and obligations 
enshrined in the ECHR. Unlike UNCLOS or other multilateral treaties, the ECHR is not limited to 
a specific field or activity; rather, the Convention establishes that certain human rights must be 
protected within the jurisdictions of the Contracting Parties. This could potentially cover anything 
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from the EU’s rules on competition law to actions taken under the CFSP. It would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to draw up a declaration of competences setting out all the potential fields which 
the Convention may cover. While the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
a key human rights treaty to which the EU is a full contracting party, does require the EU to 
submit a declaration of competences,127 this declaration is rather short, vague and open-ended 
in describing the competences regarding the implementation of the Convention. 128  Another 
reason why a declaration of competence would be inappropriate in the ECHR system is that, 
under ECHR law, competence is not necessarily the touchstone upon which responsibility is 
based. The case law of the Strasbourg Court evinces a willingness to examine issues other than 
competence when determining responsibility.129 
 
A further problem with the “declaration of competence” model is that it would ultimately require 
the Strasbourg Court to identify the correct respondent in a given case. This would arguably 
require the Strasbourg Court to make its own assessment of the division of competence within 
the EU legal order. This would be a clear violation of the autonomy of the EU legal order, since 
it would allow a Court other than the CJEU to rule on issues related to the interpretation of EU 
law. Another proposed option was the introduction of a special procedure whereby the 
Strasbourg Court could deliver its opinion on which party is the correct respondent in any given 
case. Again, based on the case law of the CJEU, inviting the Strasbourg Court to make such a 
determination would arguably violate the autonomy of the EU legal order, and the Accession 
Agreement would not survive an Opinion of the Court of Justice. 
 
The option that has been chosen, and is now enshrined in the Accession Agreement, is to 
introduce a new “co-respondent procedure” to the Strasbourg Court. The Explanatory Report 
states that the co-respondent mechanism was necessary in order “to accommodate the specific 
situation of the EU as a non-State entity with an autonomous legal system that is becoming a 
Party to the Convention alongside its own member States.”130 Under this model, it remains the 
prerogative of the applicant to choose the party against whom to bring proceedings. However, 
the co-respondent procedure allows another party (either the EU or an EU Member State or 
Member States) to be added as a co-respondent in certain cases. A co-respondent is not an 
intervening party, but a full party to a case,131 and judgments are equally binding on both the 
respondents. While it was generally agreed that a co-respondent mechanism was the best way 
to ensure cases are addressed to the appropriate party, there was disagreement regarding how 
such a procedure should function in practice.132 
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Article 3 of the Accession Agreement sets out the modalities of the “co-respondent mechanism” 
that will be introduced to the ECHR system. The Convention shall be amended to add the 
following passage at the end of Article 36, which is to be renamed “Third party intervention and 
co-respondent”: 
 
The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become 
a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances 
set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application 
shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the 
proceedings.133 
 
The Accession Agreement sets out two situations where the co-respondent mechanism would 
apply. The first scenario allows the EU to be added as a co-respondent in cases where an 
application has been brought against one or more EU Member States, and the allegation against 
the Member State “calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a 
provision of European Union law, including decisions taken under the TEU and under the TFEU, 
notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under 
European Union law.”134 This is designed to cover Bosphorus situations, where the alleged 
violation of the Convention rights stems from a Member State implementing binding EU law. In 
these cases, the violation may be found in an act of an EU Member State, but the breach can 
only be rectified at the EU level.  
 
The second scenario allows EU Member States to become co-respondents where an allegation 
against the EU “calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a 
provision of the TEU, the TFEU or any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to 
those instruments, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an 
obligation under those instruments.”135 This provision demonstrates that the ECtHR will have 
jurisdiction in cases where the alleged violation stems from EU primary law. In such cases, it is 
not the EU as such that is capable of rectifying such a violation, since the TEU and TFEU can 
only be amended by the Member States. It is not entirely clear, however, whether this provision 
would entail all the EU Member States being added as co-respondents, since a change to EU 
primary law would require approval of all 28 Member States.  
 
There are two ways a party can become a co-respondent: either  by accepting an invitation by 
the Strasbourg Court to become a co-respondent or upon a request by a Contracting Party.136 A 
co-respondent is a full party to the case, and the judgment of the Strasbourg Court applies to 
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both respondents.137 Under this format, there would be joint responsibility between the EU and 
the Member State for the violation of the Convention, and it would be up to the respondent and 
co-respondent to decide how to repair any violation. The Accession Agreement addresses the 
issue of responsibility in cases where a co-respondent is involved. Article 3(7) states that:  
 
If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-
respondent to the proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-
respondent shall be jointly responsible for that violation, unless the Court, on 
the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-respondent, and 
having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them be 
held responsible.138 
 
This means that in cases where the EU or Member States appear as respondent and co-
respondent, there will be a presumption in favour of joint responsibility. This presumption can be 
rebutted if the Strasbourg Court decides to find only one party to be responsible.  
 
The co-respondent mechanism is another novelty in the Accession Agreement in terms of 
international law. Though it has been suggested that the possibility of “co-defendant” status 
could be used in other dispute resolution bodies, such as the WTO, 139  the mechanism 
introduced by the Accession Agreement is not seen in other multilateral treaties in which the EU 
and the Member States both participate. In those cases, it is up to the party bringing the case to 
decide against whom to bring legal proceedings. 140  The co-respondent mechanism adds a 
somewhat complex procedure to the ECHR system, and it is unlikely that in other organizations 
the EU would be afforded similar treatment. The co-respondent mechanism will likely be a 
special feature of the ECHR system, rather than a precedent for other international bodies the in 
which EU participates. 
 
4.6  PRIOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE CJEU 
 
The Communication of the two Presidents of the Courts included a condition that any Accession 
Agreement allow some form of prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.141 It stated that “In order that the principle of subsidiarity may be respected also in that 
situation, a procedure should be put in place, in connection with the accession of the EU to the 
Convention, which is flexible and would ensure that the CJEU may carry out an internal review 
before the ECHR carries out external review.” The draft Accession Agreement provides for this 
possibility, stating that, in cases where the EU is a co-respondent, and the CJEU has not 
already had the chance to assess the compatibility of Convention rights, then “sufficient time 
                                               
137
 Art. 3(1) Accession Agreement, supra note 18. 
138
 Article 3(7) Accession Agreement, supra note 18. 
139
 See S. Griller, E. Vranes, ‘EC-Bananas Case’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford Public 
International Law < http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil >: “It is particularly striking that, under the DSU, there is no co-defendant status 
enabling other WTO members—like the group of 77 ACP countries that were more or less directly affected by the outcome of the 
EC–Bananas Case—to join the respondent in a dispute in which they take an interest.”  
140
 See Hoffmeister, supra note 12. 
141
 Joint Communication, supra note 77, 2. 
31 
 
shall be afforded for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an assessment, 
and thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court.”142 The Agreement also sets 
out that this assessment by the CJEU should be “made quickly so that the proceedings before 
the Court are not unduly delayed”.143 
 
It may be seriously questioned whether such a clause is indeed necessary. The Convention 
does not provide a similar procedure with respect to any of the state Contracting Parties. If the 
EU is to be treated in a similar manner to other contracting parties, is the EU not provided 
“special treatment” by allowing the CJEU to have a chance to first assess the case? One legal 
argument is that such a procedure is necessary due to the fact that, under the EU’s legal 
system, there is a possibility that a case will not reach the CJEU before it reaches Strasbourg. 
For instance, a court of an EU Member State may simply decide not to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling, in which case, the CJEU will never have been provided the opportunity to rule 
on the legal issue.  
 
However, if the CJEU is not given the opportunity to rule on a given case involving Convention 
rights, this is due to the rules of procedure in the EU legal order. This is not a situation that 
arises due to the specific nature of the EU legal order as such; it derives from an alleged defect 
in the procedural law within that legal order. This defect could be remedied, for example, by 
modifying the CJEU’s case law, or amending the EU Treaties. Jacqué, for instance, argues that 
a more logical solution to this issue would be reform the preliminary reference procedure “by 
requiring national courts to conduct a preliminary ruling in all cases in which the conflict between 
an act of the Union and the ECHR is invoked.”144 However, in order to satisfy the CJEU, the 
drafters of the Accession Agreement decided instead to confer upon the EU special treatment, 
treatment that is not afforded to the UK Supreme Court, the French Cour de cassation, or any 
other European high court. As Lock notes, “the introduction of a specific procedure 
guaranteeing a prior involvement of the ECJ leads to a privileging of the EU’s legal order over 
the legal orders of other parties to the Convention.”145 Craig argues that it is not the nature of 
the EU legal order that necessitates the prior involvement procedure, but the restrictive standing 
criteria used in the EU legal system: 
 
 It nonetheless remains paradoxical that the EU courts should be able to use 
Article 3(6) of the Draft Agreement in order to “pause” the case at Strasbourg 
in order for the CJEU to adjudicate on the substance of Convention rights, 
where it was the CJEU's very own restrictive standing criteria that prevented 
the EU courts from doing so before the case was taken to Strasbourg.146 
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Such exceptional treatment is not afforded to the EU, or any other regional organization, in other 
multilateral treaties. The prior involvement procedure is an anomaly under international law. At 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, where EU measures may be challenged,147  the 
CJEU is not afforded a special status by being given the opportunity to have first examined the 
EU measure at issue. Of course, there are important differences between dispute settlement 
procedures at the international level and procedures designed to protect human rights in the 
ECHR system. However, the reasoning behind the prior involvement mechanism is the same in 
both cases: an EU measure should not be challenged without the CJEU first having had a 
chance to review that measure in the light of its own legal order. 
 
Second, the Accession Agreement is entirely silent on what procedure would be employed to 
allow the CJEU to make an assessment of the compatibility of an act with Convention rights. 
Presumably it is up to the EU itself to establish this procedure, however it is yet unclear how this 
would be done, and who would bring such a case before the CJEU. 148  The Accession 
Agreement simply states that the CJEU’s assessment should be “made quickly.”149 However, 
there is absolutely no guarantee that the CJEU will act in an expedited manner. The Strasbourg 
Court already struggles with a heavy caseload;150 having to wait for the CJEU to make an 
assessment may only add to this burden. 
 
The procedure raises further questions. How will it apply regarding actions taken under the 
CFSP? In principle, the CJEU does not have jurisdiction over CFSP acts, whereas the CFSP is 
not excluded from the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. What will be the legal consequences 
of a CJEU judgment under the prior involvement procedure?151  
 
The prior involvement procedure is unlikely to be employed on many occasions; as the Joint 
Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris puts it, “[i]n all probability, that situation 
should not arise often.”152 However, the procedure is problematic in that it affords the EU legal 
order a privilege that is not necessitated by any special feature of that legal order. Moreover, the 
Accession Agreement fails to give any indication of how such a procedure would actually 
operate in practice, leaving it entirely up to the Union to establish such procedure. The 
hypothetical situation that would lead to the use of a prior involvement procedure, that is, where 
the CJEU was not given an opportunity to hear a case before it went to Strasbourg, exposes a 
flaw in the EU’s system. This flaw in EU procedural law should be remedied within that order, 
rather than introducing a new procedure in the ECHR system. 
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4.7 EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES 
 
Article 35 ECHR sets out the admissibility criteria for matters before the ECtHR. It states inter 
alia that “The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law.”153 Where an EU act 
is directly challenged, the situation is relatively straightforward: the applicant will have had to 
first challenge the act at the EU level in order to exhaust “domestic” remedies in that system. 
According to Article 1(5) of the Accession Agreement, the term “domestic” in this context simply 
means “the internal legal order of the European Union.”154 This raises the question of how the 
concept of exhaustion of domestic remedies will be applied in the context of the EU legal order. 
While a direct challenge before the CJEU would count as such a domestic remedy, it is doubtful 
whether other processes within the EU legal order, such as administrative procedures or 
complaints to the European Ombudsman, would be considered “remedies” since they are not of 
a judicial character.155 The issue of effective remedies available within the EU legal order, or 
lack thereof, is likely to be subject to cases before the Strasbourg Court upon EU accession.  
 
In another scenario, the EU act will be indirectly challenged through the domestic legal order of 
an EU Member State. In this case, it may be asked whether a reference for a preliminary ruling 
will be regarded as a domestic remedy that must be exhausted. The Joint Communication of the 
two Presidents states that a “reference for a preliminary ruling is normally not a legal remedy to 
be exhausted by the applicant before referring the matter to the ECHR.”156 Similarly, the Draft 
Accession Agreement states that “[s]ince the parties to the proceedings before the national 
courts may only suggest such a reference, this procedure cannot be considered as a legal 
remedy that an applicant must exhaust before making an application to the Court.”157 This is 
because it is entirely up to the national court to decide whether or not to make a reference.158 
The fact that a national court failed to refer a matter to the CJEU will not therefore affect the 
admissibility of the complaint before the Strasbourg Court. However, in this situation, the CJEU 
will be given the opportunity to deal with the issue via the “prior involvement procedure” 
discussed above.159 
 
A further question arises regarding whether, in cases where the EU and Member States are 
respondent and co-respondent, the applicant will need to have exhausted domestic remedies in 
both legal orders. The Accession Agreement states, regarding the co-respondent procedure, 
that “admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-
respondent in the proceedings.” 160  This means that in situations where the EU is a co-
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respondent, an application will still be admissible, even if domestic remedies have not been 
exhausted in the EU legal order.161 
 
4.8 RESERVATIONS  
 
Article 57 ECHR states that “[a]ny State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing 
its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention.”162 The question arose during negotiations whether the EU should also be capable 
of making reservations to the Convention or the additional protocols. The drafters decided that, 
since the EU should join the Convention on the same footing as the other Contracting Parties, 
the EU would be capable of making reservations, declarations and derogations, either at the 
time of accession, or when acceding to future additional protocols. The Accession Agreement 
provides that the following paragraph is to be added to Article 57(1) ECHR: “The European 
Union may, when acceding to this Convention, make a reservation in respect of any particular 
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law of the European Union then in force is not 
in conformity with the provision.”163  
 
It is not clear whether the EU intends to make any reservations to the Convention at the time of 
accession, or what any possible reservations may relate to. The EU made a reservation to the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities relating to the right of EU Member 
States to exclude non-discrimination on the grounds of disability with respect to employment in 
the armed forces.164 The possible exclusion of jurisdiction over CFSP by way of reservation165 
was discussed during negotiations; however this proposal was not accepted. The possibility of 
making a reservation regarding EU primary law was also proposed but eventually rejected.166 
The Accession Agreement works on the assumption that EU primary law is capable of being 
challenged before the ECtHR. Furthermore, such a reservation may not be legally acceptable 
given the fact that reservations of a general character are not permitted under Art.57 ECHR. 
Any EU reservation must be in conformity with general international law and the rules 
established under the ECHR system.167  Since the EU still requires non-EU states in the Council 
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of Europe to approve the Agreement, reservations by the EU may risk provoking these States 
into not accepting the Accession Agreement. 
 
4.9  ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
 
The jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court extends to the interpretation and application not only of 
the ECHR, but also of the Additional Protocols thereto.168 The EU had to decide whether it 
would also accede to these protocols, and if so, which ones. The commitments of the various 
EU Member States under the Convention are not identical since they have made various 
reservations and declarations. Their commitments also differ because different states have 
acceded to the Additional Protocols to varying extents. The Accession Agreement takes the 
approach that the EU shall accede only to the First Protocol to the Convention as well as 
Protocol No. 6.169 Article 59(2) ECHR will also be amended to allow the EU to accede to the 
other additional protocols in the future.170 As protocols are separate legal instruments under 
international law, the EU’s accession to the further protocols would require a similar process to 
that of accession to the ECHR, including a separate accession agreement.171 
 
The EU has decided only to accede to Protocol 1 and Protocol 6, as these are the only two 
protocols to which all EU Member States are parties. This raises the question whether the EU 
would have been permitted also to accede to other protocols. Under EU law, international 
agreements entered into by the Union are binding, not only on the EU institutions, but also on 
the EU Member States.172 It could be argued that if the EU were to accede to protocols to which 
some EU Member States had not joined, these Member States would be bound by international 
agreements to which they had not given their explicit consent. While this is an acceptable 
position, it seems to go against the understanding of the EU as a separate and distinct legal 
order. It is not immediately evident that the EU’s accession to the additional protocols should be 
conditioned on whether or not all the Member States have acceded to them. It is submitted that 
there is no legal impediment to the EU acceding to protocols to which only some EU Member 
States have ratified.  
 
Another option would have been for the EU to accede to the protocols that covered rights that 
were already protected under EU law, including EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These 
rights are already binding upon the EU Member State by virtue of EU law, and therefore would 
not have posed the problem of extending obligations to the EU Member States to which they 
had not given their consent. Alternatively, the EU may have acceded to additional Protocols, 
making clear that these only apply to fields of Union competences and Union law. While some 
delegations were in favour of the EU acceding to all existing Protocols, it was decided that the 
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EU would only accede to, “at a first stage”, those that have been ratified by all EU Member 
States.173 
 
This means that there will still be a ‘gap’ in human rights protection. There will be instances 
where a right enshrined in one of the protocols is binding upon certain EU Member States that 
have ratified the protocol, but is not be binding upon the Union. There may be instances where 
the EU and an EU Member State are both respondents, but the legal obligations of the parties 
differ due to the fact that the Member State and the EU have different legal obligations. This 
would be legally similar to the pre-accession situation whereby the Member State is bound by a 
certain obligation, whereas the EU itself is not. It will be interesting to see how the Court will 
deal with such a scenario, and whether it will continue to apply its pre-accession case law. 
 
4.10 SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE 
 
The High Contracting Parties will be invited to give their consent to be bound by the Accession 
Agreement and the instruments of ratification, and acceptance or approval are to be deposited 
with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.174 The Agreement shall enter into force “on 
the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date on 
which all High Contracting Parties to the Convention mentioned in paragraph 1 and the 
European Union have expressed their consent to be bound by the Agreement.”175 The EU will 
become a Party to the Convention and relevant Protocols on the date of entry into force of the 
agreement.176 The Secretary General of the Council of Europe will then notify the EU and the 
Council of Europe member States of the date when the Agreement enters into force.177  
 
The clause on signature and entry into force is similar to those of other international 
agreements, especially those under the Council of Europe. 178 It requires acceptance by all the 
member States of the Council of Europe, after a three-month period following the final 
ratification. If a state wishes to join the Council of Europe, the Accession Agreement stipulates 
that a condition of such membership includes the obligation “to give an unequivocal binding 
statement of its acceptance of the provisions of this Agreement.”179 A new Council of Europe 
state will therefore be bound, not only by the amended Convention and Protocols, but also to 
the Accession Agreement, which is to have an “explicit link” with the Convention.180 On the EU 
side, several steps are required before the EU indicates its consent to be bound. As discussed 
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above, the agreement must be approved by the EU Member States, the European Parliament, 




The Accession Agreement answers many of the questions that are posed whenever the EU 
takes part in an international organization or treaty body, and in several respects it does so in a 
novel way. In contrast to its participation in other bodies, the EU does not “divide” its 
participation in the ECHR in terms of competences. The EU and the Member States may 
exercise voting rights concurrently. They both contribute to the expenditure of the Court. They 
may both appear as respondent and co-respondent before the Court and be held jointly liable. 
This deviates from much of the international practice whereby the EU and the Member States 
exercise these rights alternatively, based upon a declaration of competences. The Agreement 
also demonstrates how EU participation can justify the introduction of new procedures. The co-
respondent mechanisms, for example, is an appropriate adaptation to the ECHR system, which 
allows the party bringing the case to decide against whom to bring proceedings. The prior 
involvement procedure, however, represents a kind of ‘special treatment’ afforded to the EU that 
is not warranted by the specific nature of the EU legal order. 
 
5 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
  
The Accession Agreement primarily deals with institutional and procedural issues that arise from 
the EU taking part in the machinery of the Convention. Commentators have examined the 
extent to which this framework may jeopardize the autonomy of the EU legal order. There has 
been less emphasis, however, on the impact that the EU’s accession may have on the 
substantive law of the Convention, that is, on how human rights law in the Convention system 
may be applied to the EU. While the EU has been a respondent in cases before international 
bodies, these have often dealt with issues of trade, such as before the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body. There is less international practice, however, of applying international human rights law to 
international organizations.  
 
The ECHR was originally drafted upon the assumption that the rights enshrined therein would 
be protected and ensured primarily by states. Similarly, the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
Court has primarily developed with the assumption that the Convention rights are to be secured 
by state contracting parties. A clear question arises regarding EU accession: to what extent do 
the provisions of the ECHR and the Court’s case law have to modified or adapted to apply to an 
international organization? This is not a topic that the Accession Agreement is capable of 
addressing fully. Many of these issues can only be tackled by the Strasbourg Court itself in 
specific cases once the EU accedes. Yet one can already envisage some of the issues that may 
arise in applying a state-based Convention to the legal order of the EU. 
 
                                               
181




Article 1 of the Accession Agreement sets out how certain terms in the Convention are to be 
interpreted with respect to the EU. First, the terms ‘State,’ ‘State Party,’ ‘States,’ or ‘States 
Parties’ in certain parts of the Convention and Protocols are to be understood as referring also 
to the European Union. 182  For example, Article 10(1) ECHR, which refers to freedom of 
expression, states that “[t]his Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.”183 In these cases, the Strasbourg Court will 
simply replace the word ‘states’ with ‘the EU’. Similarly, the Accession Agreement sets out that 
the terms ‘national law,’ ‘administration of the State,’ ‘national laws,’ ‘national authority,’ or 
‘domestic’ in certain parts of the Convention and Protocols are to be understood as relating 
“mutatis mutandis, to the internal legal order of the European Union as a non-State party to the 
Convention and to its institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.”184 For instance, Article 13 of the 
Convention states that “[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority…”185 Similarly, Article 
35(1) of the Convention regarding admissibility criteria states that the Strasbourg Court may 
only deal with a matter when “all domestic remedies have been exhausted.”186 As discussed 
above, this may give rise to questions regarding what an ‘effective remedy’ means within the EU 
legal order. 
 
The Accession Agreement also addresses the issue of terminology in the Convention that 
relates to the apparatus of the state. Some of the terms used in the Convention that would 
require modification in relation to the EU are ‘national security,’ ‘economic well-being of the 
country,’ ‘territorial integrity,’ or ‘life of the nation.’ These appear in the ECHR in Article 6 (Right 
to a fair trial); Article 8(2) (Right to respect for private and family life); Article 10(2) (Freedom of 
Expression); Article 11(2) (Freedom of assembly and association); and in Article 2(3) Protocol 
No. 4 (Freedom of Movement); and Article 1(2) Protocol No. 7 (Procedural safeguards relating 
to expulsion of aliens). These articles all allow for restrictions on the Convention rights in certain 
cases where the interests of the state are involved. For instance, Article 10(2) ECHR sets out 
that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country.”187 According to the 
Accession Agreement, these terms “shall be considered, in proceedings brought against the 
European Union or to which the European Union is a co-respondent with regard to situations 
relating to the Member States of the European Union, as the case may be, individually or 
collectively.”188 With respect to the term “life of the nation,” the EU would be permitted to take 
measures derogating from certain Convention rights in relation to measures taken by an EU 
Member State during a time of war or public emergency. Upon accession, the Strasbourg Court 
                                               
182
 Art. 1, para. 5 Accession Agreement, supra note 18. 
183
 Art. 10(1) ECHR. 
184
 Art. 1, para.5 Accession Agreement, supra note 18. 
185
 Art. 13. ECHR. 
186
 Art. 35(1) ECHR. 
187
 Article 10(2) ECHR. 
188
 Art. 1, para. 5 Accession Agreement, supra note 18. 
39 
 
will be faced with the challenge of determining whether, and to what extent, these exceptions to 




The drafters also faced questions of how rules of jurisdiction would apply regarding the EU. 
Article 1 ECHR sets out that “[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” The Convention 
uses the broad concept of ‘jurisdiction’ instead of ‘territory’. There is an ongoing debate about 
the extent to which Convention rights apply outside the territory of the Contracting Parties.189 
This debate will no doubt continue in the context of the EU. The drafters of the Accession 
Agreement had to determine how Article 1 ECHR would be applied with regard to the EU, 
especially the meaning to be given to the phrase “everyone within their jurisdiction.” 190 
According to the Accession Agreement, this will understood “as referring to persons within the 
territories of the member States of the European Union to which the TEU and the TFEU 
apply.”191 With regard to persons outside the territory of a Contracting Party, the term is to be 
understood in the context of the EU “as referring to persons which, if the alleged violation in 
question had been attributable to a High Contracting Party which is a State, would have been 
within the jurisdiction of that High Contracting Party.”192   
 
The Convention also refers to the term ‘country’ in Article 5(1) ECHR (“the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country”193) and 
Article 2(2) Protocol No. 4 (“[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”194 
The term ‘territory of a State’ is mentioned in Article 2(1) Protocol No. 4 (“[e]veryone lawfully 
within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose his residence”195) and Article 1(1) Protocol No. 7 (“[a]n alien lawfully resident 
in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision 
reached in accordance with law”196). These terms will be understood to mean “each of the 
territories of the member States of the European Union to which the TEU and the TFEU 
apply.”197 Unlike the other Contracting Parties that are states, the EU does not have its own 
‘territory.’ Article 52 TEU sets out that the EU Treaties shall apply to the EU Member States, 
while Article 355 TFEU defines the specific territorial scope of the Treaties. 
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The Strasbourg Court might be faced with interesting legal questions regarding how concepts of 
jurisdiction and territory may apply to the EU, for instance when the EU is involved in CSDP 
missions. Under Article 41(2) TEU, the Union “may use [civilian and military assets] on missions 
outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security.”198 The Explanatory Report states that Article 1 of the Agreement “applies to acts, 
measures or omissions in whichever context they occur, including with regard to matters relating 
to the EU common foreign and security policy.”199   Jacqué argues that “it is possible that 
substantive action committed by the Union’s missions might constitute a breach of the 
Convention.”200  Citing the Behrami case law, he argues that the Union would arguably be 
responsible for human rights violations where these missions are under the EU’s control.201 
Whereas the EU Treaties specifically exclude the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
from the remit of the Luxembourg Court,202 there is no similar exception or reservation regarding 
the Strasbourg Court’s jurisdiction in that field. This may lead to legal complications, such as 
during the “prior involvement” procedure before the CJEU regarding cases involving CFSP 
issues. There may be cases where the CJEU is unable to rule on EU law issues regarding the 
CFSP due to its limited jurisdiction in the field, whereas the Strasbourg Court will be capable of 
examining those issues.203 How the Courts will resolve this issue is yet another challenge. 
 
The EU-Individual Relationship 
 
Article 1 of the draft Accession Agreement addresses the issue of how terminology in the 
Convention that can only be applied to states may be applied to the EU. It does this, by and 
large, by treating the EU as a “state.” For example, it replaces notions such as “national law” 
with “the internal legal order of the European Union” without much further elaboration.204 In 
many cases, this simple change in terminology may suffice and will not give rise to any legal 
difficulties for the Court. Yet the ECHR may face challenges in applying provisions of the 
Convention that have until now only applied to Contracting Parties that are states. The Court will 
be faced with questions regarding how key concepts in its case law such as the margin of 
appreciation and proportionality, which have been developed with states as the only Contracting 
Parties, are to be interpreted and applied in the context of the EU.  
 
The Court should approach the issue by first seeing if it can treat the EU in the same manner as 
the other Contracting Parties. However, in certain cases, it may be justified that certain 
provisions are applied differently with regard to the EU. This is because there is a fundamental 
difference between a sovereign state and an international organization composed of sovereign 
states. In the former, there is a direct relationship between the state and the individual. The 
relationship between the individual and the EU is much more complicated, and will likely be 
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further developed by ECtHR case law. Upon accession, the Strasbourg Court will be called 
upon to determine how these concepts shall be applied to an international organization, where 
the relationship between it and the individual is fundamentally different. 
 
6 A TALE OF TWO COURTS: STRASBOURG AND LUXEMBOURG POST-ACCESSION  
 
The EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights is a highly exceptional 
development. It is much more than the EU joining a treaty on trade or regulating fishing stocks; 
it relates to the EU becoming bound by Europe’s key human rights instrument. It is therefore a 
significant development for both legal systems. Both the EU and the ECHR system have 
developed to a certain extent their own constitutional orders. Both are based on public 
international law foundations, yet both have developed their own specific characteristics and 
highly-developed internal law. EU Accession will pose legal questions to both of these legal 
orders, and to both “constitutional” courts. The Accession Agreement cannot resolve all of the 
issues that will arise from the EU participating in the ECHR system. The relationship between 
the two courts, a topic that has been subject to much academic debate, will continue to develop 
as new issues arise.  
 
Pre-Accession Case Law 
 
An issue that the Strasbourg Court is likely to face is the extent to which pre-accession case law 
relating to the EU will continue to apply. Particular attention has been paid to whether and to 
what extent the Bosphorus jurisprudence will continue to apply. 205  In that case, while the 
Strasbourg Court had to acknowledge that the EU was not a party to the Convention, and 
therefore not directly bound by its provisions, it did not rule out indirect review of EU law. A 
compromise approach was developed whereby the ECtHR established an assumption of 
“equivalent protection.” In future cases with similar facts as Bosphorus, the EU would be 
capable of appearing as a respondent or co-respondent alongside the Member State(s) 
implementing the binding EU legislation.  
 
It has also been argued that EU accession would remove the legal reason for the equivalent 
protection assumption. It has been pointed out that a “comparable presumption of compatibility 
does not exist, however, in relation to any of the state parties to the ECHR regardless of 
whether they may possess a highly sophisticated and protective national system of protection of 
fundamental rights.”206 Such an assumption of equivalent protection would no longer be legally 
justified upon accession. This is particularly the case since one of the goals of EU accession is 
to ensure the EU is treated as far as possible like the other parties to the Convention.207 De 
Schutter has argued that the Bosphorus doctrine may not be completely abandoned, however, 
and that it may be given a “second-life” after accession: 
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It would be neither legally justified nor politically opportune to maintain the 
Bosphorus doctrine in its current form, as a doctrine that places the European 
Union in a privileged position, and that, instead of treating the Court of Justice 
of the European Union as a constitutional court comparable to any other, 
somehow inexplicably defers to its assessments more generously than to 
similar assessments made by its national counterparts. But if, for obvious 
political reasons, Bosphorus must have a second life, then it is time perhaps 
to transform it into something that would be both more promising and more 
theoretically sound.208 
 
Whether the Strasbourg Court will continue to apply Bosphorus in its current form is just one of 
the challenges the Court will face once the EU becomes a party to the Convention. It will be 
interesting to see whether, and to what extent, the Court will continue to apply its pre-accession 
case law regarding the EU, or whether it will “start afresh” and treat the EU as a new 
Contracting Party to the Convention. 
 
ECHR law in the EU Legal Order 
 
The case law of the CJEU will also likely pay greater attention to the legal order of the ECHR. 
The ECHR and the Strasbourg case law will no longer be a source of inspiration for the CJEU, 
but will be binding upon the Union as an international agreement. As the law currently stands, 
the EU is not bound by the ECHR under international law. Under Article 6(3) TEU, ECHR law 
can guide the CJEU, or can be a source of general principles, but is not a direct source of rights 
and obligations. As Ahmed and Butler point out, “the EU is not bound to comply with the letter of 
the ECHR or case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The acceptance of any 
right as part of the ‘general principles’ of Community law is taken on a case-by-case basis.”209 
Upon accession, however, the EU will be bound by rulings in cases to which it was a party. This 
includes the CJEU, as an institution of the EU. The Explanatory Report states that “the 
decisions of the [European Court of Human Rights] in cases to which the EU is party will be 
binding on the EU’s institutions, including the CJEU.” 210  This development brings the 
relationship between the two Courts, and the two legal systems into a new era. 
 
A final issue relates to “autonomy.” This principle, and whether the draft Accession Agreement 
violates it, has been one of the key issues in the debate on accession.211 A main concern in this 
context is whether EU accession would lead to a situation whereby an external judicial body, 
that is the Strasbourg Court, would be capable of interpreting EU law. The Accession 
Agreement goes to great lengths to ensure that this autonomy is respected. The co-respondent 
mechanism, for example, leaves it up to the parties themselves to determine who will be the 
respondent in a given case, with minimal involvement of the Strasbourg Court. This avoids the 
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situation whereby the Strasbourg Court will rule on the distribution of competences between the 
EU and the Member States. Even when the Strasbourg Court will rule on the conformity of EU 
law with the Convention, the Strasbourg Court will not have the power to strike down that 
legislation, or to declare that it violates EU law. This remains the prerogative of the CJEU and it 
alone. The issue of autonomy will be the key issue facing the CJEU as it determines the validity 




The EU’s accession to the ECHR is more than symbolism; it is an important step in continuing 
to strengthen human rights protection in Europe. It poses challenges to the EU legal order, the 
ECHR system and to public international law. This article has examined how the Accession 
Agreement has addressed many of these challenges. The drafters had to strike a careful 
balance. The Agreement had to respect the autonomy of the EU legal order and take into 
account the specific features of the EU legal order. At the same time, a guiding principle was to 
have the EU to accede under similar conditions as the other Contracting Parties. The drafters 
faced numerous legal issues that were unique to the situation of EU accession to the ECHR. 
However, many of the legal challenges faced have been dealt with before in other situations 
where the EU has joined international organizations, or acceded to other international 
instruments. In this sense, EU accession is not only an important development in EU law, but in 
international law generally.  
 
The importance of EU Accession for international law should not be understated. As Gragl puts 
it, “International law has never before seen the accession of an international or supranational 
organization as legally integrated as the EU to a human rights treaty regime with a judicial 
monitoring mechanism as sophisticated as that of the Strasbourg Court.”212 It is also an example 
of an international organization becoming a party to a key human rights instrument originally 
designed exclusively for states. Should the EU continue in this vein, and join further 
international human rights treaties, including those that allow EU acts to be challenged? Could 
other IOs follow the EU’s path, and similarly join international human rights treaties? This could 
be potentially one way to address the problems related to the lack of responsibility and 
accountability of international organizations under international law. EU accession will also mark 
a new era for the two “international” Courts. Both courts will have to find ways to deal with the 
law and jurisprudence emanating from the other legal order. This will further develop 
international practice regarding the interaction between legal orders and judicial dialogue.213 
 
The Accession Agreement further develops practice regarding how the EU participates in the 
international legal order. The Accession Agreement addresses many of the legal issues in a 
unique fashion or involves novelties not seen in other cases where the EU joins an international 
treaty. These include issues such as the parallel exercise of voting rights, the calculation of 
funding, the development of a co-respondent mechanism, and the prior involvement 
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mechanism. In addition to developing further the law of responsibility of international 
organizations, EU accession illustrates some of the international law challenges that arise 
whenever an IO seeks to take part in its own right within the international legal order.  
 
EU accession may be seen by some as a one-off event, something that simply remedies a 
specific problem in the human rights system in Europe, or a mere symbolic gesture. But it may 
also be viewed as part of a wider trend, one whereby the EU seeks to take part in its own right 
within the international legal order. The EU will likely continue to join, or to upgrade its status 
within other international organizations and bodies.214 The Accession Agreement may be seen 
as a precedent when the EU joins other bodies in the future. EU accession has wider 
significance, therefore, in the development of international legal practice, especially where the 
EU takes part in bodies designed exclusively for states. It demonstrates how the EU, by seeking 
to take part in the international legal system, may have a subtle effect on that legal order. EU 
accession to the ECHR is an important step for the EU legal order, but also a significant 






                                               
214





















The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of the Humanities and 
Social Sciences recognized as a Centre of Excellence at the KU Leuven. It hosts researchers from law, economics, 
political science, history, philosophy and area studies. The Centre initiates and conducts interdisciplinary research 
on topics related to globalization, governance processes and multilateralism, with a particular focus on the following 
areas: (i) the European Union and global governance; (ii) human rights, democracy and rule of law; (iii) trade and 
sustainable development; (iv) peace and security; (v) global commons and outer space; (vi) federalism and multi-
level governance; (vii) non-state actors and emerging powers. It hosts the InBev Baillet-Latour Chair EU-China and 
the Leuven India Focus.  
 
In addition to its fundamental research activities the Centre carries out independent applied research and offers 
innovative policy advice and solutions to policy-makers. 
 
In full recognition of the complex issues involved, the Centre approaches global governance from a multi-level and 
multi-actor perspective. The multi-level governance perspective takes the interactions between the various levels of 
governance (international, European, national, subnational, local) into account, with a particular emphasis on the 
multifaceted interactions between the United Nations System, the World Trade Organization, the European Union 
and other regional organizations/actors in global multilateral governance. The multi-actors perspective pertains to 
the roles and interactions of various actors at different governance levels, which includes public authorities, formal 
and informal international institutions, business enterprises and non-governmental organizations. 
 
For more information, please visit the website www.globalgovernancestudies.eu   
 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Huis De Dorlodot, Deberiotstraat 34, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel. ++32 16 32 87 25  
Fax ++32 16 37 35 47   
info@ggs.kuleuven.be  
